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Abstract 
The objective of this research is to analyze the opinions of Shia jurisprudential authorities 
regarding the issue of abortion and its permissibility or prohibition during different stages of 
pregnancy. In turn, it was anticipated that this would reveal an array of various probable practical 
options for followers of these jurisprudential authorities to emulate given the situation in question. 
The research conducted in two stages in which the results derived from completing stage one 
constituted raw data to be processed in stage two. In this process, data was collected in stage one 
through direct and open-ended questions that were presented to the offices of Shia jurisprudential 
authorities in written format and in two separate phases. Subsequently, in stage two, the answers 
collected in stage one were furnished for analysis to a group of experts constituted of top university 
and seminary scholars. The group was presented by the researcher with questions that were 
answered in a collective interview setting. The end product of this entire process is that various 
practical solutions regarding abortion, in cases where the lives of the mother and the child depend on 
the performance of this said medical procedure, are made available for the followers of Shia 
jurisprudential authorities and doctors alike. It was discovered that abortion was unanimously 
considered permissible before the stage of “ensoulment” in all situations where the mother faced 
mortal or considerable risk. However, after the stage of “ensoulment”, its permissibility or 
prohibition depended on a series of conditions and considerations.  
Keywords: Maternal–fetal conflict, Abortion, Islamic jurisprudence, Ensoulment 
 
Introduction 
Abortion has a long history within human society and it remains a crucial point of contention 
with many societies today. It is estimated that 56 million abortions are conducted annually around 
the world. As such, one in every thirty women of fertile age (between 15 to 44 years) experiences 
this procedure every year (Sedgh, 2016). 
Abortion is highly controversial and has led to fervent and widespread debate within various 
cultures, governments and religions. Islam is no exception to this phenomenon. Scholars and 
researchers of every religion and school of thought have studied and analyzed the jurisprudential 
and legal opinions of their peers and have, subsequently, strived to determine the correct ruling with 
reference to abortion in accordance to their respective creeds and ideologies. This ruling, in turn, has 
been presented by them to their societies in order to be incorporated into action wherever needed. 
The definition of “abortion” presented within these studies varies from scholar to scholar. However, 
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for the purpose of this current research, “abortion” is defined as “The induced termination of 
pregnancy before fetal viability”(Cunningham, et al, 2014). 
Shia populations and societies are no exception with regards to this issue and, therefore, find 
themselves faced by similar challenges. In this present research, we have strived to analyze the 
rulings and opinions of Shia jurisprudential authorities concerning abortion. These opinions have 
been collected from their published legal works, as well as through discussions and direct 
interviews. Subsequently, the similarities and differences existing within these rulings were studied 
and, after focus group discussions with relevant experts, the precise edicts of the said jurisprudential 
authorities were derived so as to reveal the exact religious responsibility and obligation of Shia 
individuals within the context in question. 
Ascribing precedence over the right of life between the mother and the child, in cases where 
one or both of their lives are at risk, constitutes the most important point of contention and debate 
amongst the Shia jurisprudential authorities when dealing with the issue of abortion. For this very 
purpose, the researcher has strived, through an acute analysis of the edicts and rulings of these 
jurisprudential authorities, to ascertain the exact religious obligation of Shia individuals within these 
same conditions. Therefore, the aim of this article is to discover a solution, in accordance to the 
rulings of Shia jurisprudential authorities, to the challenge of ascribing precedence to the right of life 
between the mother and the child when one or both face mortal or considerable risk during 
pregnancy. 
Fervent debate and passionate disagreement has always existed between non-clerical experts 
and religious scholars. Sometimes, this disagreement is described as the “clash between rationality 
and religion”. Differences of opinion between religious scholars and medical experts upon topics of 
mutual concern are no exception to this principle. One of such important issues is the question 
regarding the permissibility or prohibition of abortion during various stages of pregnancy. Almost 
every other academic within this field of study has made comparative studies between the 
viewpoints of medical experts and religious scholars from various creeds and belief systems, and has 
critically analyzed these opinions. Islamic experts too have performed similar studies, presenting us 
with a host of results. One of the most challenging discussions regarding abortion is the debate that 
revolves around the permissibility or prohibition of the termination of pregnancy when the mother 
or the child, or both, are faced with mortal or considerable risk if the said pregnancy is allowed to 
continue. Even though there exist differences of opinion between medical experts and Islamic 
scholars regarding the permissibility of abortion before the stage of ensoulment, these differences 
are not critical in nature and can be reduced or completely resolved with relative ease. However, 
when dealing with the post-ensoulment stage of pregnancy, these differences become highly critical, 
especially when we study the rulings of Shia religious authorities. Given this fact, medical 
practitioners are regularly faced with clinical scenarios wherein the mother has already entered the 
19th week of pregnancy and has, therefore, crossed the point of ensoulment, but any continuation of 
the natural pregnancy process proves to be either extremely difficult or utterly impossible and may 
even lead to dire consequences including death. In such cases, and if there exists a possibility of 
survival for the baby outside the mother’s womb, doctors prematurely remove the fetus and attempt 
to sustain it artificially under special and intensive care. Obviously, the mother too is placed under 
treatment to help her recover fully. Nevertheless, things become more complicated if the fetus is too 
underdeveloped for it to survive outside the mother’s womb. Herein, doctors are faced with a 
dilemma. Normally, in such circumstances doctors will opt to abort the fetus in order to safeguard 
the mother. On the other hand, the general ruling of the Shia jurisprudential authorities dictates that 
aborting the fetus after ensoulment if prohibited in the absolute sense and without exception. 
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Imagine a woman who has carried a baby within her womb for five months. However, her 
doctor tells her that due to medical complications e.g. the mother’s cardiac condition any 
continuation of the said pregnancy may lead to her own death. This news in itself is traumatic 
enough. Unfortunately, the mother is also informed that she is obligated to refrain from abortion 
even if this costs her her very life. The mother is now faced with an excruciating dilemma: to save 
herself she must abort her beloved child, but in doing so she will face divine wrath in the afterlife. 
On the other hand, if she fails to abort, seeking divine pleasure and reward in the hereafter, she loses 
both her child and her own life. 
All the while, the mother and her husband are obliged to follow the laws of Islam, but this 
becomes even more complicated when they find themselves faced with a difference of opinion 
between their medical advisors and their religious scholars. To make things even worse, they 
discover that the various jurisprudential authorities are also at odds with one another regarding the 
religious edict pertaining to this situation. For instance, the husband emulates a certain jurist while 
the doctor under advisement emulate another and this leads to a conflict of ideas. Similarly, the 
mother may emulate a jurist who believes that abortion is permissible within the said situation while 
the husband emulates a jurist who deems it prohibited. In this scenario, the husband may pressure 
the mother not to abort because he feels it to be sinful and believes himself to be the decision-maker 
(or Wali) vis-à-vis the child in question. On the other hand, the mother requires the husband’s 
support and strength at this delicate moment and cannot pursue her own health and safety without 
his backing. Likewise, we may even imagine a scenario wherein the opposite comes to pass i.e. the 
mother emulates a jurist whose edict prohibits abortion under the said conditions. Herein, she will 
find herself shying away from abortion in order to avoid divine retribution, and shall have to place 
her trust in divine mercy while depending upon the essentially relative and non-absolute nature of 
medical science, hoping against hope that she and her child may somehow dodge the outcome being 
prophesized by her doctors. 
Another aspect of the moral dilemma present in such a scenario can be seen if a doctor 
emulates a jurist who prohibits abortion. Here, the doctor will find himself or herself torn between 
the dictates of his or her religious obligations and those of his or her professional duties. Performing 
one professional duty, in this situation, leads to abhorrent sin and murder, while performing one’s 
religious duty leads to the endangerment of one’s patient and a vital breach of professional trust. 
Given all this, we need to explore whether Shia jurisprudential authorities really deem 
abortion in the post-ensoulment stage to be prohibited in the absolute sense. Do they really believe it 
to be forbidden even if it may translate into the mother’s death? Or do they allow exceptions to their 
general edicts in this regard? 
These are the questions that we seek to answer in this research. 
 
Theoretical Background of the Research 
Islam is a comprehensive religion that has a ruling for each and every human action. It 
prescribes laws to the most personal of individual actions, as well as all manners of social 
interactions, be they within the parameters of a family, or a community, or between a government 
and people it governs, or even between various governments. Hygiene and medical issues are one 
such field of life wherein Islam has particular laws and rulings. For this very reason, Islam plays a 
very active role in the daily life of Muslims and practically shapes the entirety of their lives. 
Therefore, it is only natural that Muslims find it important to look towards Islam when faced with 
the issue of abortion. 
A study of historical records shows that abortion was not common place amongst the Arabs 
during the advent of Islam. However, they did engage in infanticide due to certain economic and 
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cultural reasons (Kan’an, 2001). Islam explicitly forbade such infanticide and declared, “Do not kill 
your children out of fear of destitution. We provide them sustenance and you as well” (The Holy 
Qur’an,17: 31). Furthermore, Islam gave its followers clear directives in which it made them 
responsible for safeguarding the psychological and physical health of pregnant women and children, 
and in doing so, educated Muslims about the essential rights of women and children. Two examples 
of such teachings are seen in these directives: “Respect your children” (Al-Hurr al-‘Amili,1983)and 
“You child is your master up until he or she reaches the age of seven”(Majlisi, 1983). 
Similarly, Islam has paid special attention to the rights of people within society, and has even 
legislated rights for animals and the eco-system in general. As such, it has deemed it necessary for 
Muslims to compensate for even the slightest of damages, even if such damages were unintentional 
in nature (Khuyi, 1996). Given this extraordinary sensitivity towards preserving the rights of the 
individual, the society, and even nature itself, it is not strange that Islam deems the murder of one 
innocent person equivalent to the murder of humanity in its totality. Likewise, it is not astonishing 
that this same system of beliefs and laws teaches us that if we grant life to just one individual, we 
have indeed bestowed the gift of life upon all human beings (The Holy Qur’an, 05: 32). 
Furthermore, Islam encourages people to have multiple children and deems it an honor 
(Majlisi, 1983). Following this same policy, Islam prohibits abortion and not only deems it to be a 
sin, carrying punishment in the afterlife, but also prescribes a financial penalty upon those who 
engage in this activity. This issue carries such grave importance that, in accordance to the rulings of 
a majority of Shia and Sunni religious authorities, a pregnant woman cannot artificially terminate 
her pregnancy even during the initial days after conception. According to these scholars, a woman 
who commits such an act will have to be punished and shall, as such, be obliged to pay a financial 
penalty called Diyah. It is even more interesting to note that the amount of this financial penalty 
rises in correspondence to the fetus’s age. Thus, when a fetus enters the state of ensoulment (120 
days after conception or approximately 19 weeks after the woman’s last menstrual period – LMP)1 
the penalty levied is equal to the legal penalty applicable to cases of unintentional homicide 
(Khamenei, 2016). Therefore, the general and primary principle concerning abortion in Islam is 
prohibition. Have said this, there exists considerable disagreement amongst Islamic scholars with 
reference to this matter, especially amongst the Shia and Sunni religious authorities. What follows is 
a brief description of these various opinions. 
 
The Viewpoint of Sunni Jurists 
1. Abortion Before Ensoulment 
Different writers have presented different classifications regarding the various opinions of 
Sunni scholars regarding pre-ensoulment abortion. For instance, Abdul Fattah Mehmud Idris 
(Professor of Comparative Jurisprudence at the AL-Azhar University) presents us with the following 
classification: 
a. Prohibition of aborting the Nutfah: Some scholars within the Hanafi and Maliki 
schools of thought, along with Ghazali (who belonged to the Shafi’I school of thought) and Ibn Jozi 
(from the Hanbali school of thought). 
b. Permissibility of abortion before the Nutfahperiod is completed: Some scholars from 
the Maliki school. Most of the Shafi’I school and some from amongst the Hanbalischool. 
                                                 
1 From the Islamic point of view, the developmental stages of a fetus are divided into three periods, each periods having 
40 days. The first is called Nutfah, the second is called `Alaqah and the third is called Mudghah. Collectively, these three 
stages add up to 120 days after conception (Al-Kulayni, 2010).Shia and Sunni scholars unanimously agree that upon 
reaching the 120 day benchmark, ensoulment occurs (Sachedina, 2009).  
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c. Permissibility of abortion before completion of the `Alaqah period: A minority 
amongst the Shafi’i 
d. Permissibility of abortion until the period of Mudghah and before the formation of 
organs: Some scholars of the Hanafi school. 
e. Permissiblity of abortion before ensoulment: A minority from amongst the Hanbali 
school (Idris, 1993). 
However, Ali Mohiiddin Al-QarahDaghi (The Deputy Secretary General of the International 
Union of Islamic Scholars and Professor of Jurisprudence and Principles of Jurisprudence at the 
Qatar University) and Ali Yusuf Al-Muhammadi (Professor at the Jurisprudence and Law 
Department of the Qatar University) have presented the views of Sunni scholars about abortion in 
the following manner within their book titled Fiqh al-Qadayah al-Tibiyah (The Jurisprudence of 
Medical Issues):  
a. Most Sunni jurists prohibit abortion except for situations wherein the mother’s life 
may be at risk. Almost all Hanafi jurists, a majority of Shafi’I jurists and several Hanbali jurists 
adhere to this opinion. 
b. However, some Hanafi jurists, some Shafi’i jurists, some Maliki jurists and one 
Hanbali jurist believe abortion to be permissible before the stage of ensoulment. Certain Maliki and 
Shafi’i scholars deem it permissible up until the 40th day of pregnancy, and prohibited thereafter. 
Some Hanafi jurists deem it permissible to perform abortion before the stage of ensoulment only if it 
is absolutely unavoidable. On the other hand, certain other Hanafi scholars rule that abortion is 
unconditionally permissible before this stage in pregnancy. Similarly, certain Shafi’i jurists declare 
that only illegitimate fetuses (conceived out of wedlock) may be unconditionally aborted before the 
stage of ensoulment (Al-QarahDaghi and Al-Muhammadi, 2006). 
Abdulaziz Sachedina (Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Virginia) has 
presented yet another classification in his book titled “Islamic Biomedical Ethics”. After having 
listed the said distribution of Sunni jurisprudential opinions, he summarizes its contents as follows:  
“Generally speaking, this stage is recognized as the pre-enrolment stage, andmajority of the 
jurists allow abortion at this stage only when necessary. Up until this stage these jurists do not think 
that the fetus has acquired individuality and personhood which God has forbidden to 
destroy"(Sachedina, 2009). 
The General Presidency of Scholarly Research and Ifta (Saudi Arabia) made the following 
declaration about abortion during its 29th meeting in Riyadh in 1987:  
"When is it permissible to abort a pregnancy? 
1- It is not permissible to abort a pregnancy at any stage except for a Shar`y (Islamically 
lawful) justification and within very tight limits. 
2- If the pregnancy is in the first stage, which is forty days, and aborting it serves a Shar`y 
purpose or averts an excepted harm, then it is permissible. 
3- It is not permissible to abort a pregnancy if it is `Alaqah (clot; a piece of coagulated 
blood) or Mudghah (a little lump of flesh). 
However, if a trustworthy medical committee states that the continuance of the pregnancy 
will endanger the mother's life and may cause her to die, then it is permissible after using every 
possible means to avert these dangers" (The General Presidency of Scholarly Research and 
Ifta,1987) 
2. Abortion After Ensoulment 
Adbul Fattah Mehmud Idris has listed instances from nine of the most credible source texts 
within Sunni jurisprudence and has concluded that there is no disagreement about the prohibition of 
  
Ahmad Mashkoori, Ali Kazemian, Seyed Mahmoud Tabatabaei, Seyed Kazem Mostafavinia 
 
 
Openly accessible at http://www.european-science.com                                                     263 
 
abortion after ensoulment has taken place. He does not mention any exceptions that may be taken 
into consideration (Idris, 1993). 
However, The General Presidency of Scholarly Research and Ifta (Saudi Arabia) stated the 
following during their 29th meeting in 1987:  
"It is not permissible to abort a pregnancy after the third stage (i.e. after the completion of 
four months of pregnancy) unless a group of trustworthy specialists in the field state that if the fetus 
remains in the mother's womb, it will cause her to die. This should be done only after using every 
possible means to maintain the survival of the fetus"(The General Presidency of Scholarly Research 
and Ifta ,1987). 
Sachedina elaborates upon the Sunni jurisprudential position regarding post-ensoulment 
abortion in the following manner:  
“There was overall agreement among the jurists that abortion after ensoulment is unlawful 
unless the mother’s life is in danger." (Sachedina, 2009) 
Nevertheless, Ali Mohiiddin Al-QarahDaghiand Ali Yusuf Al-Muhammadi mention that 
there exists a consensus amongst Sunni jurists regarding the impermissibility of abortion in the post-
ensoulment stage. In the same book, titled Fiqh al-Qadaya al-Tibiyah al-Mu’asirah (The 
Jurisprudence of Contemporary Medical Issues), they go on to cite certain examples of classical 
Sunni jurists explicitly declaring such abortion to be prohibited even if the continuation of 
pregnancy may prove fatal for the mother. However, they explain these explicit declaration as 
follows:  
“If we attain definitive knowledge, or it is seen to be highly probable, that the mother would 
die if the said pregnancy is allowed to continue, then certainly abortion is permitted. The explicit 
declaration of classical jurists prohibiting abortion under such a condition is simply a result of them 
not being able to conceive that such a danger actually existed” (Al-QarahDaghi and Al-
Muhammadi,2006 ). 
 
The Viewpoint of Shia Jurisprudential Authorities 
1. Abortion in the Pre-Ensoulment Stage of Pregnancy 
In contrast to Sunni jurists, some of whom deemed abortion to be unconditionally 
permissible in the pre-ensoulment stage of pregnancy, the primary ruling of Shia jurisprudential 
authorities declares that abortion is prohibited right from the time of conception. However, they do 
mention a few of exceptions wherein this primary law may be ignored. For instance, if continuing 
the pregnancy exerts unbearable pressure and hardship upon the mother, or if it carries fatal risk, 
then abortion is permissible (Shirazi, 2016). 
2. Abortion in the Post-Ensoulment Stage of Pregnancy 
While Shia jurisprudential authorities have accepted “unbearable hardship” or “risk of death” 
as sufficient reason for a person to ignore the primary prohibition of abortion after conception and 
before ensoulment, they have either made no comment about post-ensoulment abortion in their 
books of religious edicts or have simply declared that post-ensoulment abortion is unconditionally 
prohibited (Shubairi and Sistani, 2016) 
Given this situation, the researcher has strived to analyze the different scenarios possible for 
pregnancy after ensoulment so that a solution may be derived to the problem at hand. 
 
Methods 
From the standpoint of its objective, this research is applicative and explorative in nature 
because its results are directly applicable in real life situations within society and it serves to 
increase the scope of the field of study to which it pertains. Likewise, since the methodology of data 
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collection employed within this study is qualitative in nature, the research is categorized as a 
qualitative investigation. Similarly, the research at hand is a multi-tier qualitative study since it was 
conducted in two stages, stage one dealing with attaining answers to jurisprudential questions from 
Shia jurists and classifying them and stage two dealing with the analysis of these answers within a 
focus group setting. 
 
Stage One of the Research: 
In order to discover the exact academic ruling of Shia jurisprudential authorities regarding 
post-ensoulment abortion, we formed an advisory council of experts and thus framed the following 
questions. It was also kept in mind that the general and primary ruling of these jurists is that of 
prohibition. 
The question posed: “Will abortion in the post-ensoulment stage become permissible if there 
is certainty that any continuation of pregnancy will lead to the mother’s death?” 
The above query was presented to the offices of eleven of the Shia jurisprudential 
authorities. Like their Sunni counterparts, it was expected that their response would deem the given 
circumstance (i.e. fatal risk to the mother’s life) an exception to their primary prohibitory verdict 
about abortion in the post-ensoulment stage. 
The answers of these Shia jurists regarding the permissibility or prohibition of abortion in 
the post-ensoulment stage, if a continuation of pregnancy bore fatal risk for the mother’s life, are 
listed as follows:  
 
a. Five from amongst the eleven jurists consulted deemed it permissible to abort the 
fetus even in its post-ensoulment stage if a continuation of pregnancy bore fatal risk for the mother. 
b. The remaining six jurists responded that they do not believe any such abortion to be 
lawful or permitted. From amongst these six jurisprudential authorities:  
(i) Two jurists simply responded that given the circumstances mentioned in the question 
they did not deem it permissible to abort the fetus. 
(ii) Two jurists replied that they believe it to be prohibited based on Al-Ihtiyat Al-Wajibor 
necessary religious precaution. 
(iii) The remaining two answered, “Such an abortion is prohibited unless a continuation 
of the said pregnancy bore fatal risk for both the mother and the child. If fatal risk existed for both 
the mother and the child, and aborting the fetus was the only way of saving the mother while utterly 
no way existed to save the child, only then would such an abortion be deemed permissible”. 
At this point, the first four jurists who had ruled that such an abortion is prohibited were 
contacted a second time and presented with another question. This question was as such: “In the 
post-ensoulment stage of pregnancy, if a continuation of the said pregnancy bore fatal risk for the 
mother while the fetus in itself was still incapable of sustaining life independently outside the 
mother’s womb, meaning that if the mother were to die than the fetus would certainly die as well 
and, simultaneously, the only way of saving the mother’s life were to abort the mentioned fetus, 
would it be deemed permissible to perform the given abortion so that at least the mother’s life may 
be salvaged?” 
The answers given by the above-mentioned four jurists to this second question are as 
follows:  
(i) One jurist replied that abortion in these particular circumstances is permissible. 
(ii) Three jurists replied that, based upon Al-Ihtiyat Al-Wajibor necessary religious 
precaution, they believed abortion to be prohibited even in these particular circumstances. 
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Stage Two of the Research 
By taking into consideration that there exists a conflict between preserving the life of the 
fetus with preserving the life of the mother during the post-ensoulment stage of pregnancy, and that 
five out of the eleven Shia jurists consulted upon this matter ruled that abortion under the given 
circumstances was permissible while six of them ruled that it was prohibited, it was decided that the 
difference of opinion between the Shia jurisprudential authorities in this matter warrants further 
study, analysis and thought. It was also hoped that through such additional analysis and study a path 
could be found by which the opinion of this latter group of jurists could be changed. Therefore, the 
following was decided:  
(i) The essential source and cause behind this edictal difference be found. 
(ii) The cause governing the prohibition levied by the last three jurists in question be 
specified. 
(iii) A probable path for changing the opinion of these three jurists be discovered. 
(iv) If effort towards changing the opinion of these three jurists were to fail, a path should 
be found to help their respective followers out of the said dilemma. In this manner, it is sought that a 
solution be provided for these said followers so that they may partake in the medical procedure 
necessary for preserving their health while not transgressing upon the restriction levied upon them 
by Islamic law and without having to carry the emotional and psychological burden of sin. 
For this purpose, experts in jurisprudential law were invited so that the above questions may 
be pondered upon within a focus group discussion (FGD) setting. Thus, twelve experts in Islamic 
jurisprudential law, all of whom are engaged in academic activity within this field of study at the 
highest level of research within the Holy Seminary, were invited to join the discussion at hand. The 
subject of these discussions and all related and relevant contents had already been made available to 
these individuals in written format. After a period of ten days following the invitation, the first 
discussion session was conducted in which nine people participated. Five of these nine experts held 
academic qualifications from both seminary and university backgrounds. Three of the said persons 
held qualifications in medical sciences and their presence in these meetings furnished the group with 
a critical opportunity to be able to better understand the subject at hand and reach a conceptional 
consensus about what exactly was under delibration. This, in turn, increased the possibility of 
providing a framework that could be beneficial in any effort aimed at changing the opinion of the 
above mentioned jurists. 
The questions that were discussed within this focus group were as follows:  
1. What do you believe to be the essential cause behind the ruling of jurists who have 
deemed abortion to be prohibited within the post-ensoulment stage of pregnancy? 
2. What are the probable causes behind the ruling of the three jurists who have deemed 
abortion in the given circumstances to be prohibited? 
3. What arguments or explanation may be provided to these three jurists in order to 
bridge the gap between their opinion and that of experts within medical science? 
4. If efforts aimed at changing the opinion of these three jurists were to fail, does the 
mother in question, and the doctor under advisements, really have  
no option but to accept the inevitability of the mother’s demise? 
 
Results 
After thoroughly discussing all of the above questions and analyzing each of the said queries, 
the final opinion of the expert panel was as follows:  
1. With reference to the difference of opinion between the Shia jurisprudential 
authorities, which is reflected in the disparity that exists within their respective edicts, the expert 
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panel declared that if the issue of “abortion” is examined on the primary level (wherein the 
procedure itself is taken into consideration barring all other externalities and periphery 
circumstances) then there exists a consensus amongst the Shia jurisprudential authorities regarding 
its prohibition. The differences of opinion and ruling arise when “abortion” is viewed, not within its 
normal context, but rather within circumstances that are extraordinary in nature like in pregnancies 
wherein a failure to abort the fetus poses mortal risk to the mother’s life. Islamic jurisprudence 
contains certain general principles that serve to exempt people from laws if such laws were deemed 
to assert extraordinarily severe pressure on the person in question or pose considerable or mortal risk 
to his or her well-being. The disagreement between the jurists in this and similar cases originates 
from their interpretation regarding the extent of the applicability of these said general principles as 
well as the extent of their strength when faced with the circumstances in question. Therefore, we see 
that all the Shia jurisprudents come to the same ruling when dealing with the issue of abortion in its 
normal and ordinary context. This unanimity is due to the fact that they all use the same general 
principles. However, when dealing with abortion in its extraordinary context, wherein these general 
principles clash with and contradict the specific and primary laws regarding the case under 
consideration, we see that the same jurists begin to disagree with one another in their respective 
edicts. This disagreement is caused by their different interpretations and understandings regarding 
the extent of the applicability of these general principles and the magnitude of their strength when 
faced with contradictory primary laws. Likewise, it is also possible that different scholars derive 
differing conclusions when studying a singular religious text, which naturally leads to a disparity in 
verdicts. 
2. Following are the reasons why Shia jurisprudential authorities tend to avoid deeming 
it permissible to perform abortion in the post-ensoulment stage:  
2-1. Within Islam’s teachings, a fetus in the post-ensoulment stage bears the same legal 
statusas that of any other human being, and is dealt with in accordance to the same rules and laws 
which are applicable upon the latter. As such, killing a fetus in the post-ensoulment stage is 
considered willful homicide just as it would be deemed homicide for a person to kill a fully grown 
human being. Thus, aborting a fetus in this stage of the pregnancy is prohibited. To quote one of the 
experts in this field of jurisprudence, “Doctors may choose to call it abortion, but as far as we are 
concerned it is murder, simply because any fetus in the post-ensoulment stage is a human being”. 
2-2. There exists an explicit narration attributed to Imam Jafar al-Sadiq (as) which says, “If a 
woman’s monthly menstruation period is delayed, do not give her medicine in order to induce the 
onset of the said period, for there is a possibility that she may be pregnant”(Al-Hurr al-‘Amili, 
1983). According to this narration, it is forbidden to artificially induce menstruation which might 
result in aborting a newly conceived fetus even in the earliest possible stage of conception which 
normally manifests itself as a missed period. From here it is concluded that if abortion is 
categorically prohibited at this nascent stage of fetal developments, it must most definitely be 
forbidden in all latter stages of fetal growth including the post-ensoulment stage.  
2-3. Islam prescribes several special rights to pregnant women. These special rights and legal 
privileges are designed to safeguard the child she carries. For instance, Islam prohibits any delay in 
the execution of criminal punishments, but if a pregnant woman were to be found guilty of a crime 
that carries a considerable physical penalty (e.g. adultery etc.), the execution of this said penalty is 
delayed until after the (two year) nursing period that follows the child’s birth. This demonstrates the 
importance ascribed by Islam to the child’s well-being. (Al-Hurr al-‘Amili, 1983) 
2-4. There does not exist even one reliable narrated tradition or text that may indicate the 
permissibility of abortion. To quote one of the experts in this field of jurisprudential law, “All the 
existing texts and traditions that speak of abortion, speak of it in prohibitory terms”. 
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2-5. Firstly, a fetus is not considered a part of the mother’s body like her other organs and, 
therefore, it is not permissible for the mother to do with it as she pleases. Secondly, even if the fetus 
were considered a part of the mother’s body, still the mother would not have enjoyed any such right, 
since Islam does not deem us to be owners of our own bodies but rather see us as trustees entrusted 
with safeguarding this property which essentially belongs only to God. 
2-6. The fact that the opinions and rulings of medical experts are based on statistical 
probability and do not represent absolute certitude. Furthermore, there always exists the probability 
of the doctor making an erroneous diagnosis or being overly cautious in his ruling. “It has been 
repeatedly observed that the diagnosis delivered by expert doctors was later proven to be wrong. 
Our case may not, therefore, differ from this trend”. Similarly, it has been observed that “female 
medical experts quickly prescribe abortion even at the slightest sign of a problem, simply to stay on 
the safe side of things”. 
2-7. Another reason why Shia jurisprudential authorities tend to avoid giving edicts that 
allow abortion is that in numerous cases the circumstances leading to the medical prescription of 
abortion are not natural, but rather results of certain medical practices. For instance, the fetus in 
question may develop problems warranting an abortion simply because the mother consumed certain 
medicines that are harmful for fetal growth or due to undue exposure of the fetus to harmful x-rays 
etc. Given this overall environment, any ruling in favor of the permissibility of abortion is deemed 
an act that may facilitate certain mothers in unlawfully harming their own unwanted though healthy 
babies so that, once damaged, they would not face any legal or jurisprudential restriction or obstacle 
while aborting the said deformed fetuses.  
3. The following are some of the possible arguments that, when presented to the said 
Shia jurisprudential authorities, may serve to change their opinions on the matter under 
consideration:  
3-1. Self-preservation and self-defense: One of the self-evident and undeniable rights of any 
individual is the right to self-preservation and self-defense. Every individual has the right to defend 
him or herself when faced with a threat. Islam, too, recognizes and acknowledges this basic right. In 
our scenario, the mother is question is facing mortal danger and should be allowed to exercise her 
right to self-preservation and self-defense. As such, she should be able to opt for aborting her fetus if 
no other way towards self-preservation existed. In fact, it is irrational and unacceptable to demand 
that the mother embrace death so that her baby may live, let alone embrace death in a situation 
wherein her baby may die as well.  
3-2. The mother’s right to life hold precedence over the fetus’s right to life: When faced with 
circumstances wherein we must choose who is to live and who must die between the mother and the 
child, it is self-evident that we must prefer the mother. This is because the mother is currently a 
fully-grown human being, whereas the fetus at this point is far from birth and needs to go through a 
long and dangerous process for it to be born. As such, it is better to abort the fetus, within the 
scenario being discussed, rather than allowing it to continue upon the risk of losing the mother. 
3-3. Choosing a path that is less detrimental means that when faced with a situation wherein 
one must choose either between losing the fetus or losing both the fetus and the mother, one must 
only choose an option that bears the least degree of possible harm. To quote one of the experts 
present during the discussion being cited, “Safeguarding the life of half a person (i.e. a person not 
yet fully formed) should not used as an excuse for us to kill and fully formed human being”. 
3-4. One of the arguments presented during the discussion in question pertained to two 
general principles existing within Islamic jurisprudence, namely “The Principle of Extraordinary 
Severity” (Al-usrwa Al-haraj) and “The Principle of Unavoidable Necessity” (Al-Iztirar). However, 
this argument failed to win the favor of several of the participants involved in our focus group. Thus, 
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this argument was rejected because these two general principles are manifestations of divine 
clemency wherein God intends to remove unbearable pressure from the shoulders of a person faced 
with such extraordinarily strenuous circumstances, not shift the said pressure from the person in 
question to another individual. Application of the given principles to our case would prove 
advantageous for the mother but would invariably lead to harming the fetus and, therefore, will 
represent an instance of shifting intolerable pressure from one person to another, especially since we 
consider the fetus a complete person. Thus, the said principles are not relevant to our discussion. 
4. In terms of suggesting solutions for mothers or doctors faced with situations wherein 
the mother in question faces mortal risk, the participants of our focus group came forth with the 
following options:  
4-1. The first option presented after a thorough analysis of the various rulings on abortion by 
Shia jurisprudential authorities was endorsed by the entire team of experts. This solution explained 
that the Shia jurists who have deemed post-ensoulment abortion to be prohibited, even in cases 
where both the mother’s life and that of the fetus’s is equally in danger, have done so based upon the 
jurisprudential doctrine of necessary precaution (or Ihtiyat). Rulings made due to the application of 
this particular doctrine, in contrast to edicts formed independently of this doctrine, are such that the 
followers of the jurist involved are allowed the freedom to refer to another juristic authority who 
holds a different verdict on the matter under consideration and emulate his ruling instead of that held 
by the first. As such, followers of the three Shia jurisprudential authorities who believe abortion to 
be prohibited even in the special circumstances explained above can freely revert to and emulate the 
opinion of any of the other Shia jurisprudential authorities who have allowed abortion within the 
scenarios discussed herein. As a result, there no longer exists any jurisprudential obstacle barring 
abortion during the post-ensoulment stage in cases where continuing the pregnancy endangers both 
the mother’s and the fetus’s lives, while saving the mother, in contrast to the fetus, is deemed to be 
the only available and possible option. 
4-2. The second option that may resolve the dilemma in question is an over-ruling 
proclamation (or Hukm) issued by a legitimate Islamic ruler (or Hakim Al-Shar’) declaring abortion 
in such cases permissible. According to Islamic jurisprudence, such a proclamation hold precedence 
over all other edicts issued by individual Shia jurisprudential authorities and must, therefore, be 
followed by all people regardless of whom the emulate in other issues of juristic importance. 
 
Discussion 
Thorough research and analysis showed that the Shia jurisprudential authorities are 
unanimous in prohibiting pre-ensoulment abortion because of the availability of explicit narrations 
within reliable religious source texts declaring abortion to be impermissible. However, most of these 
jurists also believe that this primary law can be ignored within exceptional circumstances wherein 
the continuation of pregnancy exerts extraordinarily severe pressure upon the mother concerned or 
causes an unacceptable degree of harm to her. On the other hand, a few Shia jurisprudential 
authorities deemed the primary prohibition revocable only in cases where the mother faced mortal 
danger and a clear risk to her life. However, both these groups of Shia jurists are unanimous in 
believing that a fetus within the pre-ensoulment stage is inferior in worth to be a fetus in the post-
ensoulment stage. The difference between their respective verdicts is a reflection of whether or not 
they hold the presence of significant harm or danger, regardless of it being fatal or not, to be the 
deciding factor that renders the primary prohibition of abortion in the pre-ensoulment stage annulled 
in favor of secondary permissibility. The reason behind this difference is disparity between their 
individual understandings of religious source texts, as well as their differing interpretations 
regarding the scope and strength of general jurisprudential principles. 
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Nevertheless, quite a few of the Shia jurisprudential authorities prohibit abortion in the post-
ensoulment stage even in circumstances where continuing the said pregnancy may result in the 
mother’s death. The reason behind this absolute prohibition is that in the post-ensoulment stage they 
believe the fetus to have development into a legitimate person, endowed with a human spirit that 
causes it to command religiously sanctioned sanctity and the right to life, a sanctity and right that 
mirrors those enjoyed by the mother herself. Therefore, there is no reason, in their opinion, to strip 
the child of its sanctity and right to life in order to preserve the sanctity and right to life of the 
mother. 
Similarly arguments proposing that we ascribe precedence to the mother’s right to life over 
the child’s right in this same regard because the mother is currently a full human while the fetus is 
only potentially so, or because the mother bears primary status in this relationship since the child is 
dependent upon her for its very existence while the child is merely a peripheral entity, or because we 
need to avert the loss of a crucial matter (i.e. the mother’s life) by sacrificing matter that is important 
(i.e. the child) but not as important as the first, or because there exists a possibility of rendering 
several children motherless if the mother in question were to die, or because the mother can 
compensate for the lost fetus by bearing more children in the future if she manages to survive this 
dangerous pregnancy by way of the abortion involved, are all arguments that are categorically 
rejected by the Shia jurists at hand. The Shia jurisprudential authorities do not believe these 
arguments to be sufficient in proving the religious permissibility of abortion in the post-ensoulment 
stage. This rejection is further bolstered by the fact that there does not exist even a single reliable 
narration within Islamic source texts that may serve to indicate the permissibility of abortion. 
Apart from all this, God is definitely the Master and Lord of all human-beings and it if He 
who controls life and death. He commands how destinies are formed and may change them as He 
wills. Thus, His commandments are to be accepted and followed, and we must submit to His divine 
will with regards to the path that He has forged for us, especially when we see that He has promised 
great rewards in the hereafter for women who suffer any form of harm during pregnancy (Al-Hurr 
al-‘Amili, 1983). 
As far as medical science and the diagnosis derived from it is concerned, the fact that it 
depends on statistical probability and does not base its rulings on absolute certainty does not mean 
that its verdicts are worthless and unreliable. Similarly, it is incorrect to reject such diagnoses simply 
by declaring that certain doctors are overly cautious. In fact, being overly cautious in matters dealing 
with great threats such as the eminent possibility of death represents rational decision-making and, 
therefore, cannot be condemned as an instance of irrationality. Furthermore, ignoring such risks is 
definitely illogical in nature. When we study our own religious ideology, we find that according to 
the teachings of our religious apostles and sages the Islamic belief in God’s omnipotence and His 
absolute control over life and death is not deemed contradictory to human free-will and action. We 
are taught that God works according to particular principles and laws and, therefore, we must not sit 
idly aside waiting for miracles to happen. It is said, “God has refused to do things except by way of 
their proper means” (Al-Hurr al-‘Amili, 1983). Similarly, the Holy Prophet’s (P.B.U.H.) directive 
wherein he says, “Bind the camels knees and then trust in God” demonstrates that we must act in 
accordance to knowledge and wisdom as far as our capabilities allow (Majlisi, 1983).However, 
whether our effort bear fruit or not is a matter that lies in God’s hands and we must request Him to 
grant us His favor so that our efforts may produce the desired results. Therefore, when medical 
science declares that a certain pregnancy bears mortal risk for the mother and the baby, and that the 
possibility of their survival is miniscule, we cannot simply ignore this knowledge and choose instead 
to sit and wait for a miraculous outcome. 
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When some Shia jurisprudential authorities reject these arguments, their followers end up 
facing a complicated dilemma if they ever find themselves in a situation where a mother bears a 
viable fetus in the post-ensoulment stage but continuing the said pregnancy can prove fatal to her. 
The only way out of this dilemma is to ignore the verdict of the Shia jurisprudential authority they 
follow and to refer instead to another jurist who deems such abortions permissible. However, 
choosing a Shia jurisprudential authority for emulation is only legitimate after a person has 
researched the academic standings of all of the top-most jurists of his time and, as a result of this 
research, has reached the conclusion that the jurist in question is definitively the foremost expert in 
Islamic law amongst all his peers. As such, referring to another jurist after having reached the above 
conclusion can only take place if this other jurist were found to be higher, or at least equal to, the 
originally chosen juristic authority with reference to his academic expertise and knowledge. This, in 
turn, creates another problem, since it reveals that the original conclusion and choice was essentially 
flawed.  
Given the problem at hand, the opinion of Sunni jurists contrasts with the verdict of their 
Shia counterparts because they have accepted arguments such as those listed earlier, namely the 
precedence of the mother compared to the child in cases where their respective rights to life are in 
contradiction. 
However, in cases where the continuation of pregnancy in the post-ensoulment stage 
endangers the mother’s life, given that the fetus itself is no more deemed viable, eight out the eleven 
Shia juris-consults ruled abortion to be permissible, while three of them ruled it to be prohibited 
even in these circumstances basing their verdict on the doctrine of “necessary precaution”. The fact 
that this latter group has based its verdict upon the doctrine of “necessary precaution” leads us to 
believe that these Shia jurisprudential authorities are fully aware of the importance of abortion 
within the given situation, but are shying away from declaring it permissible because they wish to 
avoid shouldering the responsibility of allowing the killing a legitimate person that enjoys 
religiously sanctioned sanctity (i.e. the fetus in our case). If this were not so, they would have 
declared the performance of abortion in our given circumstances to be prohibited in much more 
explicit terms and without depending upon the doctrine of “necessary precaution”, similar to their 
earlier verdicts regarding other forms of abortion. As such, their ruling would not have differed 
based upon the viability of the fetus involved, but would have been the same regardless of whether 
the fetus were viable or not. 
The end product of the opinions of all experts involved was seen to be thus: In cases where 
the continuation of pregnancy after the post-ensoulment stage threatens the life of the mother, and 
the fetus itself is also deemed to be unviable, and abortion is considered the only way to save the 
mother’s life, none of the followers of the Shia jurisprudential authorities consulted in our research 
are faced with any significant religious obstacle in their path towards the performance of the said 
abortion. As such, there no longer exists any need for the issuance of an “over-ruling jurisprudential 
proclamation” (or Hukm) by a legitimate Islamic ruler (or Hakim Al-Shar’) in order to resolve the 
issue at hand, simply because such proclamations are reserved for situations where a dead-end has 
been confronted and no other solution exists. 
 
 
Suggestions 
It was discovered through the course of this study that, given the current circumstances, no 
real religious obstacle exists in the path of aborting a fetus in situations where a continuation of 
pregnancy threaten the lives of both the mother and the child. However, the problem surfaces when 
we face situations where saving the mother’s life clashes with saving the child’s life. Here, medical 
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experts need to present us with stronger and more convincing arguments such as those based on the 
mother’s right to self-preservation and self-defence, or the argument centered around the mother 
being a fully realized human entity while the child is still merely a potential human being. At the 
same time, there is a need for Shia jurisprudential authorities to complement the efforts of medical 
efforts in this regards and, thus, issue clearer and more definitive verdicts with reference to the 
problems at hand. Similarly, research for ascertaining the accurate time of ensoulment can help in 
reducing unnecessary religious precaution in these matters. These points can be particularly 
advantageous in societies where the laws are in line with Islamic principle, particularly the verdicts 
of Shia juristic authorities. The results of any and all such researches will have great and direct 
effects on the laws and regulations governing current medical practices and will serve to greatly 
reduce the problems faced by the followers of Shia jurisprudential authorities. 
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